Introducing Lebanon's very own Buthaina Shaaban

Michel Aoun's press secretary (he actually has one!), May Akl, wrote an outrageous piece for Foreign Policy.

The bottom line is that she dismisses the Syrian demonstrators as Sunni fundamentalists. She is outraged:

"....it would be outrageous -- to say the least -- to think that in Syria, the U.S. position will be aligned with that of Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi"

So, basically, the US should oppose something (that is in it's own interest) simply because a lunatic supports it? This, alas, is an excellent example of the Politics of Spite at which Aoun excels.

The underlying fear is evident in this passage:

"...the fall of the Assad regime is very likely to have critical consequences on neighboring countries. From Turkey to Israel, going through Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, this fall would mean a radical alteration of the political, and more importantly religious, map of the Middle East."

The corollary to this is that the "religious" identity of the politicians is more important than the actual policies. But then, what other analysis can you expect out of Lebanon's sillier sectarian minds?

I've never heard of May Akl before. Apparently she writes occasionally for the Daily Star, just like Buthaina Shaaban. She is a lot more eloquent than her boss, just like Buthaina Shaaban is more eloquent than Assad.  But she does not seems to have actual policy responsibility, just like Buthaina Shaaban. Her only handicap seems to be that she is not a relative of her boss, just like Buthaina Shaaban.

Setting the Gold Standard in Transparency

Syria's Ministry of Interior, a model of openness and transparency in government, is inviting offers for teargas  on its website.

Update: The government has now removed the original site, but here's the webcache, via Mustapha. 

Three Big Pigs

Ben Ali, Mubarak and Gaddafi, co-staring the Angry Birds.

Two reasons to worry about Egypt

Mubarak's fall was one of the most exciting moments in the Middle East in a long while. But I'm not sure that anything we are seeing now is cause for optimism. In a nutshell, here's the problem:

1. Egypt faces impossible choices: I will spare you a diatribe on Egypt's budget and debt dynamics. Suffice it to highlight that on the eve of Egypt's revoltution, the country had a budget deficit of 8% of GDP, depended on Tourism for 20% of its foreign exchange earnings and had expenditures that look like this:

Government Expenditures as % of GDP

 Source: IMF



You are reading this right: the government spends 6.1% of GDP subsidizing fuel (5.1%) and food (1%). In his last action in office, Mubarak raised wages, so the 7.1% spent on wages is now higher than it used to be. But oil prices have also risen globally since then, as have food prices. My point? The government is facing a much bigger bill than is implied by the chart above, and must cut subsidies - but this is likely to get people rioting again!

2. No one knows what Egyptians want: Everyone agrees that Egyptians want democracy, but what else do they want? What are their economic priorities? We don't know, because the country has never been a democracy. To appreciate the depth of this mystery, you need to look no further than the Twitter feed of Wael Ghonim, one of the admirable curators of the Egyptian revolution. A couple of days ago, he was asking people via twitter to suggest topics for him for an editorial he was invited to write.

It is heartwarming that a leading activist is listening to the crowds, but it is also worrisome that the demands of Egyptians are not immediately obvious even to himself! Predictably, the reponses were conflicting:




Yes, it is good to see some people want freer trade, but some people want more government spending from a government that can't even afford to maintain its current spending!

I don't envy the economic policy makers in Egypt. They are damned whatever they do.

Top 5 reasons why Hafez Assad was better than Bashar

5. Hafez did not pretend to reform. He just didn't reform.
4. Hafez took responsibility for his actions. He did not shy away from assuming responsibility for killing.
3. Hafez was consistent. He did not send mixed messages.
2. Hafez listened to his advisors. He did not say they want to reform, but "I'm holding them back."
1. Hafez did not giggle like a 5 year old girl at his own jokes.

To all "pragmatists" (Hillary Clinton), crypto-intellectuals (David Ignatius), or downright insane (Joshua Landis), eat your own words about Bashar the reformer now.

Syria Ambassador Imad Moustapha is not defecting

I noted that some people saw the blog by Syria-clown-in-DC, Imad Moustapha,  as a sign of wavering. He referred to the dead in Dara'a as "Martyrs". It is not. SANA, the official Syrian news agency also referred to them as "martyrs":

Bashar al-Assad offered "condolences to the families of the two martyrs who died during the unfortunate events which took place in Daraa on Friday"

The truth is that every other person that dies in the Middle East is a "martyr". Even car accident victims are "martyrs." The word doesn't mean much more than "dead of unnatural causes."

But the blog entry is more interesting because of its Freudian slips:  read Shostakovich for spineless, and "Xenon" (Zeno of Tarsus) for the Syrian regime's unabashed regional expansionary policies.

Click on the image for my comments.

Assad nominates Hariri for PM!

Hussain Abdul-Hussain's blog highlights the author's own article in Kuwait's Al-Rai paper. The Washington-based author says that Bashar Assad has approached US officials to suggest that he is ready to recommend (to his allies in Beirut) the nomination of Saad Al-Hariri as Prime Minister of Lebanon again. Read the whole article here (Arabic).

If true, this confirms that Assad is desperate to re-ingratiate himself with Arabs, by appearing to move away from his alliance with Iran. Tony Badran has an excellent piece on why Assad will not move away from Iran.  For an in-depth look at the complex relationship between Hizbollah and Syria, I recommend this piece by Emile Hokayem.

It is easy to look at Assad's gesture as a kiss of death. But it does not need to be. March 14 have been re-invigorated by the recent protests, and are back "on message" by focussing squarely on Hizbollah's weapons.  Assad cannot deliver Hizbollah's weapons to the negotiating table, and it is difficult to imagine another Hariri premiership now that can duck the question of those weapons. This nomination will only expose Assad's own impotence.